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PETITION
Appellant Celsius Energy Company (hereinafter
"Celsius") hereby petitions the Court, pursuant to the terms of
Rule 3 5, Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure, for rehearing of this
appeal on the grounds and for the reasons set forth below. l

BACKGROUND
In its decision in this case, this Court announced the
rule that a landowner' s correlative rights in an oil and gas pool
may only be enforced with respect to production after a spacing
order is entered with respect to the landowner' s property.
Although the landowner' s correlative rights in the pool exist in
a theoretical sense before the spacing order is entered, they are
not defined—and therefore cannot be enforced—until the spacing
order is entered:
[U]nder the [Utah Oil and Gas Conservation] Act, it is
not possible to ascertain a landowner' s correlative
rights until the Board acquires the necessary data in a
formal hearing, makes the findings of fact, and enters
a spacing and drilling unit order.
Slip OP. 8. 2

1

Undersigned counsel is advised that the other appellant in
this case, the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, will seek an
extension on the time within which it must file a petition for
rehearing. We are advised that the Board expects to act on this
matter at its next meeting, which is scheduled for January 22,
1992. Celsius requests that its own petition be considered along
with any petition the Board files.
2

All references are to the Court' s slip opinion in this
case, which is dated December 31, "1991.
A copy of the slip
opinion is annexed to this petition.
-1g:\wpl\027\000018k6.W51

This general rule, as announced by the Court, is
subject to an equitable exception that may arise in the case of
exploratory or wildcat wells.

As the Court stated:

With respect to wildcat or exploratory wells,
however, where no preexisting field-wide
spacing order has been entered, the rule is
that a pooling order should be effective no
earlier than the date of a spacing order,
unless there are special circumstances which
would make it just and equitable for an order
to be retroactive to protect correlative
rights established by the Act from
inequitable or overreaching conduct.
Slip Op. 13.
11

Although the Court' s statement of the rule' s

special circumstances" exception is couched in terms of the

"inequitable and overreaching conduct" of others, presumably the
exception would extend to any special circumstances making it
unjust to exclude a period of production prior to the entry of
the spacing order.
In proceedings below, the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and
Mining (hereinafter the "Board") never made a finding on the
presence or absence of such "special circumstances;" it never had
the opportunity to do so.

Nevertheless, this Court determined

that no such special circumstances existed in the present case
and therefore affirmed the decision of the district court
reversing the Board.

In a closely related portion of its

decision, this Court determined that the United States Bureau of
Land Management (hereinafter the "BLM") (the owner of the land
with which respondents' lands were pooled") waived its correlative
-2g:\wpl\027\000018k6.W51

rights for the period before a spacing order was entered.

In

this respect also, this Court' s determination was made without
the benefit of a finding by the Board on waiver.
In this petition, appellant Celsius Energy Company
respectfully submits that the Court should not have decided these
factual issues, but should have remanded this case to the Board
for the limited purpose of determining (1) whether special
circumstances exist that would justify an exception to the
general rule precluding retroactive pooling to the period before
the spacing order, and (2) whether the BLM in fact waived its
right to claim a share in production during the period before the
spacing order.
GROUNDS FOR REHEARING
1.

This Court erred in making the factual

determination that special circumstances did not exist that would
justify retroactive pooling to first production.

That factual

issue should be submitted to the Board, and the case should be
remanded for that purpose.
2.

This Court erred in deciding that the BLM, through

inaction, waived its right to claim a share of production before
the entry of the spacing order in this case.

The limited

evidence in the record on the subject contradicts the Court's
determination.

The issue of the BLM' s alleged waiver, including

all factual determinations implicit in the issue, should be

-3c:\wnl\027\000018k6.W51

decided by the Board after a hearing in which the BLM
participates.

The case should therefore be remanded for that

purpose as well.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT SHOULD REMAND THE CASE TO THE BOARD FOR
A FACTUAL DETERMINATION AS TO THE PRESENCE OF
"SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES" THAT WOULD JUSTIFY
RETROACTIVE POOLING

The Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act, Utah Code Ann.
§40-6-1 e£ seq. (1988), gives the Board authority to make a
variety of factual determinations on matters within its
jurisdiction.

Under section 40-6-6(5), the Board is required to

determine whether the terms of its pooling orders are "just and
reasonable," and it is precluded from entering any pooling order
that it does not find to be just and reasonable.

In this case,

the Court established a new rule limiting the Board' s retroactive
pooling orders to the period after a spacing order is entered
under the terms of section 40-6-6(1), except in cases where
"special circumstances"
inequitable.

would make the limit unjust or

Slip Op. 13.

Although the Court was not explicit

about the statutory source of this exception to the general rule,
it is obviously rooted in basic fairness and section 40-6-6(5)'s
requirement that all pooling orders be just and reasonable.
After announcing the general rule that should have been
applied in this case, the Court determined—without the benefit

-42:\wpl\027\000018k6.W51

of the Board's finding on the subject—that the exception did not
apply in this case.

The Court stated:

[T]here is no basis in this case for concluding
would have been appropriate to invoke the "just
equitable" exception to the general rule and to
that the pooling order, on the particular facts
case, should have been made effective, prior to
entry of the spacing order.
Slip On. 14.

that it
and
hold
of this
the

This conclusion rests on factual assumptions that

cannot be found in the record and that were never considered by
the Board.
For example, this Court assumed that Celsius or the BLM
could, in 1983 or earlier, have successfully either voluntarily
pooled the Federal Tract with the Baird Tract or else obtained a
variance from the Board' s Rule C-3 permitting a second gas well
in the north half of section 10.

The Court assumed that in 1983

or earlier, the BLM had sufficient knowledge of the subsurface
geology to have "taken some action" to protect its share of gas
in the pool.3
The Board was not presented with these specific factual
questions and did not decide them.

3

To the extent that the Board

The Court stated:
Furthermore, the BLM was aware that the Ucolo No. 2 well
had been completed in a known geologic formation,
providing it with some basis for surmising that the
[well] might drain gas from under the BLM tract. Under
those circumstances, the BLM might have taken some
action, but it did not.

5UP &L 14.
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considered the equities of the case, it found that it could not
allow the respondents to retain more than their share of
royalties relating to the period of production prior to entry of
the spacing order.4

The important point, however, is that this

Court should allow the Board the opportunity to address these
critical factual matters in the first instance.
In Reimschissel v. Russell, 640 P. 2d 26, 27 (Utah
1982), this Court held, "It is not our prerogative to determine
whether the evidence preponderated on one side or the other.
That is the responsibility of the trier of fact."

In this case,

the trier of fact should be allowed to discharge its
responsibility. Remand would allow the Board to decide the
question whether Celsius or the BLM could have taken some
meaningful action to protect the Federal Tract from drainage
during the period prior to entry of the spacing order.

Remand

would allow the Board to decide in the first instance whether any
other "special circumstances" exist that would require a

4

The Board noted that exploration in the general area of
the parties' tracts is "expensive and high risk," and that only
through "lengthy tests" after the commencement of production could
the outer limits of the pool be determined.
Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order (June 26, 1985) at 5. With these
considerations in mind, the Board held that Rule C-3(b) precluded
the drilling of an additional well in the north half of the
section and that there were no special circumstances that would
require a departure from what it thought was the general rule
requiring pooling back to first production. Id. at 10. (A copy of
the Board7 s order was annexed as Appendix" 2 to our opening brief. )
-6g:\wpl\027\000018k6.W51

departure from the general rule announced by the Court.

Remand

would allow the BLM to defend itself against the charge (raised
by respondents on appeal to the district court) that it waived
its rights by failing to act.5

The Board should be given the

opportunity to consider these matters after hearing evidence
presented by the parties.
II.

THE COURT S FINDING THAT THE BLM WAIVED ITS RIGHTS
THROUGH INACTION IS WRONG AND LACKS SUPPORT IN THE
RECORD

We respectfully submit that there is no evidence in the
record that either Celsius or the BLM could have obtained a
spacing order earlier than 1985.

Indeed, as noted above, the

inability to obtain technical information precluded the
possibility of such an order before the Board' s entry of the
spacing order in early 1985.

There is no evidence in the record

that Celsius or the BLM could have obtained an exception to Rule
C-3 at any time.6

There is no evidence in the record that the

5

The United States participated in the hearing before the
Board but was not joined in the action before the district court,
where respondents contended that the BLM had waived its rights.
After receipt of pleadings in which this issue was raised, Celsius
asserted as a defense that under Rule 19, Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure. respondents had to join the United States as a
necessary party.
Celsius reasserted this defense at every
opportunity, but both the respondents and the district court
ignored the problem.
6

Rule C-3' s explicit purpose is to prevent waste. Neither
Celsius nor the BLM could in good faith have asked the Board for
an exception to Rule C-3 in order to drill a second well to drain
hydrocarbons already being drained by" the'existing well. As noted
in footnote 4, above, the Board found that Rule C-3(b) precluded
-7a-\wni\n?7\nnnniRkfi wsi

respondents would have voluntarily pooled their interests with
the BLM if a request had been made prior to the entry of the
spacing order.
Under these circumstances, this Court erred in
determining that the BLM waived its right to claim a share of the
pool before the spacing order was entered.

As this Court held in

Hunter v. Hunter. 669 P. 2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983):
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a
known right. To constitute a waiver, there must
be an existing right, benefit or advantage, a
knowledge of its existence, and an intention to
relinquishment. It must be distinctly made,
although it may be express or implied.
In this case, there is no evidence in the record that the BLM had
knowledge of any existing right to share in production during the
relevant period.

There is certainly no evidence of any

intention, on the part of the BLM, to waive any such right.

The

Court' s conclusion that the BLM waived its right was mistaken.
To allow the parties to present evidence on this issue, this case
should be remanded to the Board for further proceedings.

CONCLUSION
This petition is not directed at the new rule of law
announced in the Court' s recent decision in this case.

Rather,

we believe that the Court erroneously assumed facts that were

a second well.
The Board' s conclusion was based in part on a
policy derived from dicta in Bennion v. Board of Oil, Gas &
Mining, 675 P. 2d 1135 (Utah 1983J.
' See Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order at pp. 10-11.
-8g: \wpi\027\000018k6.W51

never decided by the Board.
with the legal framework.

The Court has now provided the Board
It should remand the case to the Board

for resolution of the factual issues that are now relevant.

The

Legislature has entrusted the Board with the responsibility to
protect correlative rights and discourage waste, and it should be
allowed to evaluate the facts of this case in light of the
Court' s interpretation of the Act.

This petition should be

granted.
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